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98 N.C. L. REV. 165 (2019)

“Be My Baby”: A Surrogacy Law Proposal for North Carolina*
Surrogacy has become a popular alternative for couples who are unable to carry
their own children. As artificial reproductive techniques advance, so too must
the law. States have codified surrogacy arrangements in a variety of ways,
including intent-based and best interests tests. However, North Carolina
remains one of several states that has not provided any guidance, either by
statute or case law, for its citizens considering a surrogacy arrangement. North
Carolina can and should pass a surrogacy law because it would give peace of
mind to intended parents to help ensure their surrogate children are legally their
own. North Carolina family law provides a landscape conducive to develop
surrogacy jurisprudence. The state already uses intent-based and best interests
tests to determine the custody of children. Therefore, this Comment argues that
North Carolina should develop a surrogacy statute to determine the legal
parentage of a child based on its own pre-existing custody law, using both intent
of the parents and best interests of the child as guides. By adopting a surrogacy
statute, the state can provide much-needed reassurance to people considering
surrogacy without disrupting the current family law framework. In doing so,
North Carolina will update its laws to better reflect its citizens’ needs and bring
it in line with modern reproductive practices.
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INTRODUCTION
“It was our biological child; my egg, Daniel’s sperm,” Ana Carla said.
“Because the baby was going to come out of someone else’s vagina, unless
we had a legal document saying that the baby was indeed our child and
we wanted this baby and it was not going to be in any way associated
with the surrogate, we had to go through this whole thing even though
it seems like it could have been a much . . . simple[r] process.”1
Ana Carla’s frustration foreshadows many of the issues North Carolina
couples face to expand their families through surrogacy. This Comment seeks
to ease Ana Carla’s and countless other North Carolinians’ uncertainties
regarding surrogacy arrangements by proposing a solution for the North
Carolina General Assembly to adopt.
Surrogacy—most simply a woman carrying the child of another—dates
back to at least Biblical times, when Genesis’s Abram and his wife Sarai used
their Egyptian slave, Hagar, as a surrogate mother for their children.2 In the
modern era, as fans of celebrity culture might recall, surrogacy is a popular
option for many Hollywood mothers, from Sarah Jessica Parker to Tyra Banks
to Kim Kardashian West.3 Surrogacy has surged in popularity in the last thirty
years4 due to recent scientific advancements allowing a woman to carry a child
who is not genetically hers, known as gestational surrogacy.5 Before scientists
developed in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) in the late 1970s, all surrogate mothers
gave birth to children who were genetically their own, commonly known as

1. Melissa Boughton, Modern Families Unprotected by Outdated NC Laws, N.C. POL’Y W ATCH
(Apr. 6, 2018), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2018/04/06/modern-families-unprotected-byoutdated-nc-laws/ [https://perma.cc/JL7B-5ANE].
2. Genesis 16:1–4 (New International Version) (“Now Sarai, Abram’s wife, had borne him no
children. But she had an Egyptian slave named Hagar; so she said to Abram, ‘The Lord has kept me
from having children. Go, sleep with my slave; perhaps I can build a family through her.’ Abram agreed
to what Sarai said. So after Abram had been living in Canaan ten years, Sarai his wife took her Egyptian
slave Hagar and gave her to her husband to be his wife. He slept with Hagar, and she conceived.”).
3. Corynne Cirilli, These 10 Celeb Moms Welcomed Babies Using a Surrogate, BRAVO (June 15,
2017), http://www.bravotv.com/blogs/celeb-moms-welcomed-babies-using-a-surrogate [https://
perma.cc/TLF7-YB53]; see Joe Sutton, Kim Kardashian and Kayne West’s Surrogate Has Gone into Labor,
CNN (May 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/09/entertainment/kim-kardashian-babysurrogate/index.html [https://perma.cc/22GE-W74V].
4. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that the number of artificial
reproductive technology (“ART”) cycles using gestational carriers has increased 372% between 1999
and 2013, from 727 cycles to 3432. ART and Gestational Carriers: Key Findings: Use of Gestational Carriers
in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/keyfindings/gestational-carriers.html [https://perma.cc/X9WT-GJ4M] [hereinafter ART and Gestational
Carriers].
5. See Surrogate Has Baby Conceived in Laboratory, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1986, at A26 [hereinafter
Surrogate Has Baby].
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genetic surrogacy.6 However, the advent of IVF allowed scientists to take
genetic material from both the intended mother and intended father to implant
an embryo in a surrogate who bore no genetic relation to the fetus.7 This
advancement led to the first successful gestational surrogacy in 1986.8
Improved technology resulted in increased legal headaches for surrogates
and intended parents alike. With respect to genetic surrogacy, the surrogate
carrier was also the biological mother, and courts could easily find that person
to be the child’s legal mother.9 However, courts have reached widely varying
conclusions when confronted with a surrogate who holds no biological
relationship to the child she had carried, as is the case in gestational surrogacy.10
Gestational surrogacy continues to prompt litigation today.11
There are a few important preliminary points to address in dealing with
surrogacy’s legal issues. First, it is important to note from the outset the
differences between custody and parentage; even surrogacy commentators and
judges sometimes confuse the terms.12 Custody involves a court’s determination
of a child’s legal and/or physical status in relation to another person, including
visitation rights.13 While physical custody and visitation rights are relatively
self-evident, legal custody in North Carolina “refer[s] generally to the right and
responsibility to make decisions with important and long-term implications for
a child’s best interest and welfare.”14 Importantly, courts can, and regularly do,
make custody decisions without determining the legal parentage of a child.15
6. See The History of Surrogacy: A Legal Timeline, WORLDWIDE SURROGACY SPECIALISTS, LLC
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://info.worldwidesurrogacy.org/blog/the-history-of-surrogacy-a-legal-timeline
[https://perma.cc/TE4T-R58T]; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2017); Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
(SUPPLEMENT) 97, 98 (2010) (“[Genetic surrogacy] involves the implantation of the surrogate with
the sperm of the biological father, but uses the surrogate mother’s eggs to form the pregnancy.”).
7. See Surrogate Has Baby, supra note 5, at A26; see also ART and Gestational Carriers, supra note
4.
8. See Surrogate Has Baby, supra note 5, at A26.
9. See Spivack, supra note 6, at 98 (“This earlier type of surrogacy, because it used the surrogate’s
eggs, created [a] biological . . . connection which made it relatively easy for courts to determine that
the birth mother was also the legal mother.”).
10. See id. at 99 (“This variant on surrogacy eliminated the birth mother/genetic mother equation,
and led to litigation disputing the child’s parentage.”).
11. See, e.g., Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th
Cir. 2018).
12. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993) (“The dissent would decide
parentage based on the best interests of the child. Such an approach raises the repugnant specter of
governmental interference in matters implicating our most fundamental notions of privacy, and
confuses concepts of parentage and custody.”).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-102(3) (2017).
14. Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 646, 630 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2006) (citing Patterson v. Taylor,
140 N.C. App. 91, 96, 535 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2000)).
15. See, e.g., In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 750–51, 436 S.E.2d 898, 900–01 (1993) (holding
that the Department of Social Services should retain legal custody of a badly neglected child; the court
was not called to determine—and indeed made no ruling on—the legal parents of the child).
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Parentage refers to the “legal relationship between a child and a parent of a
child.”16
Parentage is, quite simply, who a minor child’s parents are, decided in
North Carolina by genetic tests or, in the case of adoption, 17 an affidavit of
parentage.18 One judge noted the distinction between custody and parentage
this way: “Logically, the determination of parentage must precede, and should
not be dictated by, eventual custody decisions.”19 This difference is important
because while any person or agency may gain custody of a child,20 earning the
right to make decisions for the child, legal parentage belongs solely to the person
or persons who are the child’s legal parents and can only be extinguished upon
a showing of willful abandonment, neglect, or abuse of the child.21 In the
hierarchy of care for a minor child, legal parentage is supreme. While this
Comment proposes using North Carolina’s existing custody laws to craft a
surrogacy statute, the ultimate determination is one of parentage of a surrogate
child, not custody.
Second, controversy centers on the enforceability of a surrogacy contract
to determine the legal parentage of the child.22 The surrogate carrier and
intended parents sign the surrogacy contract to ensure that the woman who
carries the child for another person or couple will honor her commitment to
relinquish the child at birth and that the intended parents will, in fact, take the
child for whom they have contracted.23 However, there is no uniform surrogacy
law in the United States, and various states have taken differing approaches to
the surrogacy contract in the last thirty years.24 Some states, such as California,
have embraced surrogacy contracts and provided legal protection for the
continuance of the practice,25 while other states have banned it completely.26

16. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(16) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
17. This Comment uses the term “adoption” solely to refer to the law, circumstances, and event
of an adoption that is planned prior to the birth of a child. Though adoption can occur at any point in
a child’s life, the comparison made here is solely to adoptions planned during a pregnancy.
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-50.1(a), 48-3-206(a)–(b) (2017).
19. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993).
20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a)–(b)(1) (2017).
21. See id. § 7B-1111(a) (Supp. 2018).
22. For more on how various states treat surrogacy agreements, see MAGDALENA GUGUCHEVA,
COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN AMERICA 14–16 (2010),
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
2NWT-A9LR].
23. See id. at 6.
24. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), was the first major surrogacy case in the United
States. Spivack, supra note 6, at 99. For a more a detailed discussion of the case, see infra notes 116–31
and accompanying text.
25. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
26. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney Supp. 2019) (“Surrogate parenting contracts are
hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and unenforceable.”).
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However, a great many states have not legislated at all on surrogacy or the
validity of surrogacy agreements.27
North Carolina falls into the final category because there are currently no
statutes or case law on surrogacy in the state.28 As a result, North Carolina
parents who wish to use surrogacy are left wondering whether or not a surrogate
child will be legally recognized as their own. This uncertainty may lead
potential parents to flock to surrogacy-friendly states, such as California,
instead of taking their chances within the nonexistent legal framework in North
Carolina; some potential parents may even decide not to pursue surrogacy at
all.29 North Carolina has an opportunity to fix this problem using pre-existing
family law statutes, specifically those involving custody arrangements.
This Comment aims to provide the North Carolina legislature with a
workable solution to adopt a law on surrogacy. In doing so, this piece adds to
the scholarly discussion in two important ways. First, it takes the premise that
existing North Carolina family law can be adapted to uphold, not strike down,
the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Indeed, other North Carolina scholars
have argued for adapting existing North Carolina law to surrogacy
arrangements.30 For example, in one of the few pieces of scholarship on North
Carolina surrogacy, Katharine Bartlett argued that existing North Carolina
adoption and custody law could easily govern the law of surrogacy in the state.31
However, Bartlett concluded that existing North Carolina law would not
uphold the enforceability of a surrogacy contract.32 Written thirty years after
Bartlett’s piece and still before the codification of any surrogacy laws in the
state, this Comment arrives at the opposite conclusion: the North Carolina
legislature can effectively adapt existing child custody laws to surrogacy

27. For example, Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming have no laws regarding
surrogacy. Surrogacy Laws, SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, https://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/u-ssurrogacy-law-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/H4AJ-XXA4].
28. See Surrogacy in North Carolina, FERTILITY AUTHORITY, https://www.fertilityauthority.com/
articles/surrogacy-north-carolina [https://perma.cc/5JJ3-UV6V]; see also John L. Saxon, Who’s Your
Daddy: Comparing North Carolina’s Paternity Law and the Uniform Parentage Act, UNC SCH. GOV’T:
FAM. L. BULL., Mar. 2004, at 4, 18.
29. For more on the problems that plague intended parents using surrogacy in North Carolina,
see Boughton, supra note 1.
30. Katharine T. Bartlett, Surrogate Parenthood: Finding a North Carolina Solution, 18 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 1, 1 (1989).
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id. at 15–16 (“The policies underlying existing adoption and custody laws in this state seem
inconsistent with an enforceability approach to surrogate parent contracts . . . . A surrogate parent
contract should not be enforceable in North Carolina insofar as it ignores restrictions placed on
adoptions in this state, including the statutory requirements for revocation of consent and the
prohibition against payment of money in connection with an adoption.”).
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arrangements in order to uphold surrogacy contracts and give intended parents
more security to pursue surrogacy arrangements here in the state.
Second, this Comment introduces a two-part test, based on intent of the
parties and best interests of the child,33 that will help lawmakers craft a
surrogacy statute for legal parentage. No other scholars have suggested or
applied a two-part test within the context of North Carolina or its existing
custody laws.34 Additionally, this Comment aims to correct a common yet
concerning conflation of the legal consequences of custody with those of legal
parentage via a proposal that concentrates solely on parentage.
This Comment will proceed in five parts. Part I raises the question of why
North Carolina needs a surrogacy law. Part II briefly addresses constitutional
concerns regarding the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Part III examines
how other states have handled the validity of surrogacy contracts. Part IV
examines existing child custody laws in North Carolina and suggests a similarity
between other states’ surrogacy laws and North Carolina’s existing family law.
Finally, Part V offers a test, based on other states’ surrogacy laws and North
Carolina’s child custody laws, that enforces surrogacy contracts while also
ensuring the best interests of the child. This test will eliminate the uncertainty
that plagues North Carolina’s intended parents and bring the state up to speed
on modern surrogacy practices.35 By mapping onto existing and well-established
child custody laws and practices in the state, North Carolina can provide legal
protection to both surrogate children and their intended parents without
overhauling the state’s entire family law framework.

33. The best interests test only arises in cases where the custody or legal parentage of a child is in
question. Therefore, in the case of natural conceptions between couples, the best interests test does not
arise. This Comment considers the best interests test applicable because, while the motives behind
couples who conceive naturally and those who must use a surrogate may be similar or identical, the
mechanism by which each actually creates and acquires legal parentage of a child are different. The
ethical considerations of questioning the motives of parents or hopeful parents in one circumstance but
not the other are outside the scope of this paper.
34. For a multifactor test applied in California, see Matthew Demopoulos, Surrogacy in California:
Replacing Section 7962 of the California Family Code with a Two-Part Hybrid Best Interests Test, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1751, 1760–61 (2018).
35. For more on how North Carolina is currently “many, many steps behind the practice of
humans,” see Boughton, supra note 1 (quoting a North Carolina attorney).
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I. WHY SHOULD NORTH CAROLINA PASS A SURROGACY STATUTE?
To begin, it is important to note why North Carolina needs surrogacy laws
at all. Currently, no statutes36 or case law37 directly address surrogacy in North
Carolina, and only one statute deals with artificial reproductive technology at
all.38 As such, North Carolina lacks governing law on surrogacy in the state. The
absence of legal authority on the matter may lead some to question why North
Carolina should pass a surrogacy law in the first place. There are several reasons
to do so.
First, there is some evidence that North Carolina’s courts would uphold a
surrogacy statute. For example, some North Carolina courts have permitted
“pre-birth parentage orders,” which indicate the intended parents—instead of
the surrogate carrier—on the surrogate child’s birth certificate.39 However,
surrogacy and pre-birth orders remain an “unsettled area of law” in the state.40
Second, North Carolina needs a surrogacy statute because the current
“unsettled” status of surrogacy in North Carolina may be pushing couples to
other states to ensure their child is recognized as genetically and legally related
to them. While empirical data on surrogacy in general is scarce41—and no
estimate of the number of couples that travel out-of-state to obtain a surrogate
carrier exists—there is some anecdotal evidence that couples are forced to do
36. In 2009, members of the North Carolina General Assembly introduced a bill to enforce the
validity of gestational surrogacy agreements under certain conditions, including a court’s approval of
the agreement before the surrogate carrier became pregnant. See S.B. 440, 2009 Gen. Assemb., 2009–
2010 Sess. (N.C. 2009); H.B. 510, 2009 Gen. Assemb., 2009–2010 Sess. (N.C. 2009). The bill, in fact,
passed a first reading in the House and second reading in the Senate but was subsequently killed in
committees of both houses. See also House Bill 510, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/
BillLookUp/2009/h510 [https://perma.cc/6947-6AFS] (listing the legislative history of H.B. 510);
Senate Bill 440, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookUp/2009/S440
[https://perma.cc/4C5R-BB2X] (listing the legislative history of S.B. 440) The legislative minutes for
those committee meetings were unavailable at the North Carolina Legislative Library and North
Carolina Archives at the time of this Comment’s completion. See House Bill 510, supra; Senate Bill 440,
supra.
37. 5 Questions You Have About Surrogacy Laws in North Carolina, PARKER HERRING L. GROUP,
PLLC,
https://parkerherringlawgroup.com/surrogacy-lawyer-attorney-raleigh-nc/surrogacyinformation/surrogacy-laws-in-north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/N6QJ-ZJ4K].
38. Section 49A-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes states, “[a]ny child or children born as
the result of heterologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a
naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife requesting and consenting in writing to
the use of such technique.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2017). However, this statute is irrelevant to the
surrogacy discussion because it does not contemplate a surrogate carrier who is artificially inseminated
and gives birth to a child she does not intend to legally keep.
39. See What Is a Pre-Birth Order, and Why Is It Important?, PARKER HERRING L. GROUP, PLLC,
https://parkerherringlawgroup.com/surrogacy-lawyer-attorney-raleigh-nc/establishing-parentage-prebirth-order/ [https://perma.cc/X5ZB-DPHX]; see also Gestational Surrogacy in North Carolina,
CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS LLC https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-lawmap/north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/K6TP-3ZPQ].
40. See What Is a Pre-Birth Order, and Why Is It Important?, supra note 39.
41. For some relatively recent statistics, see ART and Gestational Carriers, supra note 4.
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just that. For example, prominent family lawyer and professor Maxine Eichner
recently discussed a North Carolina same-sex couple that was forced to travel
to Utah, a state with liberal surrogacy laws,42 to ensure they could become the
legal parents of their surrogate child.43 Similarly, a local North Carolina news
station recently reported on a surrogate carrier living in North Carolina who
carried three surrogate children using a California-based surrogacy agency, the
Center for Surrogate Parenting.44 One of the many historic criticisms of
surrogacy is that it commodifies women and babies, potentially turning a lowerincome woman’s body into a money-maker while richer women benefit.45
Whether or not this criticism remains a valid concern today, by making
surrogacy agreements uncertain at best, North Carolina lawmakers encourage
the national trade of “baby-selling”46 for North Carolina couples desperate for
a child.
This is not to say, of course, that all states should be forced to enact the
same legislation regarding surrogacy.47 Surrogacy is an issue fraught with debate
and constitutional concerns,48 and states should be left to legislate—and indeed
have legislated—as they see fit on the issue49 as “laboratories of democracy.”50
However, by refusing to enact legislation on surrogacy at all, North Carolina is
missing a valuable opportunity to regulate surrogacy arrangements in the state
and help mitigate the number of couples forced to contract for a baby across
state lines.

42. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-807 (Westlaw through 2019 First Special Sess.) (settling the
parentage of a child born to surrogacy); see also id. § 78B-15-808 (upholding surrogacy agreements).
43. Interview with Maxine Eichner, Graham Kenan Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of
N.C. Sch. of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 4, 2018).
44. ‘The Ultimate Gift’: Local Surrogate Mother Helps Fulfill Others’ Dreams, WRAL (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://www.wral.com/the-ultimate-gift-local-surrogate-mother-helps-fulfill-othersdreams/18099563/ [https://perma.cc/8BSJ-H3FZ].
45. See Rebecca Beitsch, As Surrogacy Surges, New Parents Seek Legal Protections, PEW
CHARITABLE TR. (June 29, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2017/06/29/as-surrogacy-surges-new-parents-seek-legal-protections
[https://perma.cc/
FCV8-ETMG]. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009) (providing a historic account of why surrogacy was once viewed as
“baby-selling” and how those views have since changed).
46. See Scott, supra note 45, at 109 (explaining some of the “baby-selling” drama that accompanied
the In re Baby M case).
47. There are such issues within family law, such as jurisdiction for child custody, that have been
uniformly adopted. See, e.g., UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997).
48. See infra Part II.
49. See infra Part III.
50. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”).
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Lastly and most importantly, a well-established surrogacy law would
eliminate, or at least drastically reduce, the insecurity that intended parents feel
with regard to their child’s parentage. North Carolina currently uses genetic
blood tests51 or affidavits52 in the case of adoption to determine a child’s
parentage.53 These two methods of determining parentage pose problems for
couples in which one of the intended parents is not genetically related to the
child.54 Couples in that situation, most notably same-sex couples, are left with
serious uncertainty about whether or not they will be the legal parents of the
child they intend to bring into the world through the surrogate.55 Even
opposite-sex couples who use a gestational surrogate, meaning both intended
parents are fully genetically related to the child, are required to file a document
certifying the child legally belongs to them.56 A well-defined surrogacy law that
establishes legal parentage of a surrogate child would eliminate these obstacles
and bring peace and security to intended parents.
II. A STATE LAW PROBLEM: THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
As a preliminary matter, the issues surrounding the enforceability of
surrogacy contracts belong with state legislatures and in state courts. Since the
late nineteenth century, federal courts have recognized a “domestic relations
exception” to federal jurisdiction.57 The domestic relations exception dictates
that “family law [is in] the exclusive domain of the states.”58 Originally, the
exception applied to “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child,”59 although later cases limited the exception to
“divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”60 Despite its somewhat unclear
parameters,61 the domestic relations exception stands for the proposition that,
except in “rare instances . . . in which it is necessary to answer a substantial
federal question that transcends or exists apart from the family law issue, in
general it is appropriate for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1(a) (2017).
52. See id. § 48-3-206.
53. See Boughton, supra note 1 (“There are only two ways to be a parent in North Carolina - one
can be an adoptive parent or one can be a genetic parent.”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890); see also Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family
a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 131 (2009).
58. Harbach, supra note 57, at 131.
59. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593–94.
60. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); see also Bradley G. Silverman, Federal
Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125 YALE L.J. 1364, 1366–67 (2016) (providing an
overview of relevant case law).
61. See Silverman, supra note 60, at 1366.
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relations to the state courts.” 62 Surrogacy thus likely qualifies as a “delicate issue
of domestic relations” that state courts and legislatures are the most equipped
to handle.
Of course, the United States Supreme Court has seemingly disregarded
its domestic relations exception in certain areas pertaining to family law.
Therefore, any surrogacy solution proposed by the states must still fit into the
parameters of constitutional jurisprudence. For example, while the Supreme
Court has never decided a surrogacy case,63 it has recognized certain implicit
fundamental rights, such as reproductive and child-rearing freedoms. The
Supreme Court first found in Griswold v. Connecticut64 a constitutional right to
privacy, a concept now firmly entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence as an
implicit fundamental right.65 Intimately intertwined with the right to privacy is
the right to procreate, central to such decisions as Eisenstadt v. Baird66
(unmarried couples must have the same access to birth control as married
couples)67 and Skinner v. Oklahoma68 (forced sterilization is unconstitutional
because individuals have a right to reproduce).69 Then, in Roe v. Wade,70 the
Court declared a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy,71 later upheld in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.72 Likewise, parents have a fundamental right to rear
their children as they see fit without undue interference from the state.73
Parents also have the right to control who may visit their children.74
In sum, as the Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts75 held, “the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.”76 Thus, the Court, without deciding a surrogacy case, has

62. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 13 (2004) (citation omitted), abrogated
by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
63. See Arina O. Grossu, Opinion, Supreme Court Must Take on Heartbreaking Surrogacy Case, H ILL
(Sept. 30, 2017),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/353252-supreme-court-must-take-onheartbreaking-surrogacy-case [https://perma.cc/EFS7-NHGV].
64. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
65. Id. at 486.
66. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
67. Id. at 454.
68. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
69. Id. at 541.
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. Id. at 164.
72. 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
73. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (holding parents have a right to have
their children educated in a language other than English); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 519 (1925) (holding parents have a right to send their children to private school if they wish).
74. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000).
75. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
76. Id. at 166.
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nevertheless provided the constitutional framework in which states must
operate when crafting surrogacy laws.
Without a direct answer from the Court, scholars and litigants alike have
argued surrogacy agreements do not fit within the Court’s family law
jurisprudence because they violate a surrogate’s constitutional freedoms. For
example, some have argued that surrogacy agreements violate the surrogate’s
implicit, fundamental privacy rights77 and the right to an abortion, should the
surrogate seek one.78 Still others have argued that surrogacy agreements infringe
upon a surrogate’s right to procreate and right to companionship with her
child.79
While these are valid constitutional concerns, there are also important
counterarguments. For example, in the first major surrogacy case in the United
States,80 the New Jersey Supreme Court found in In re Baby M81 that the
“parent-child biological relationship, by itself, does not create a protected
interest in the absence of a demonstrated commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood; a natural parent who does not come forward and seek a role in the
child’s life has no constitutionally protected relationship.”82 Similarly, and
perhaps most convincingly, a surrogate has the freedom to contract away any
fundamental rights she chooses by “freely and knowingly entering into the
contract” in the first place.83
If and until the Supreme Court decides a case involving surrogacy, which
is unlikely due to the domestic relations exception, states are left to grapple with
the various constitutional boundaries the Supreme Court has set forward. Since
the issue of surrogacy has been left to the states, states must be permitted to
“serve as . . . laborator[ies]”84 to legislate on surrogacy arrangements
accordingly.
Surrogacy is a unique human condition, situated at the crossroads of
contract law, concepts of bodily autonomy, and fundamental constitutional
rights. This Comment’s proposal for North Carolina does not run afoul of the
United States Constitution precisely because it allows for the surrogate to
“freely and knowingly” agree to the terms of the surrogacy arrangement, leaves

77. See Spivack, supra note 6, at 107.
78. See Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th
Cir. 2018).
79. In re G.P.B., Jr., 736 A.2d 1277, 1285 (N.J. 1999).
80. Spivack, supra note 6, at 99, 101.
81. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
82. Id. at 1255 n.14 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258–62 (1983)); see Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254–55 (1978).
83. Spivack, supra note 6, at 109–10.
84. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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some room for the surrogate to change her mind, and bolsters certainty in legal
parentage.85
States across the country have grappled with these constitutional
arguments and legislated various surrogacy solutions as explored in the next
part.
III. SURROGACY ACROSS THE COUNTRY
A.

California’s Intent-Based Test

While many states, like North Carolina, have not yet broached the issue
of surrogacy in lawmaking, other states have developed different approaches to
the practice. One approach is the intent-based test, which centers on the validity
of a surrogacy contract between the two parties: the intended parents who want
the child and the surrogate carrier who carries the child.86 The idea is that if the
intended parents and surrogate carrier do in fact intend for the surrogacy to
occur and manifest this intent in a surrogacy contract, then the contract is valid
and will be upheld.87
California, perhaps the most surrogacy-friendly state in the country,
chiefly utilizes this approach.88 In 1975, the state adopted the Uniform
Parentage Act (“UPA”), which determines parentage by examining the
relationship between parent and child once the child is born.89 The UPA takes
an intent-based approach, stating that if the contracting parties meet various
requirements, such as a minimum age and completion of a mental health
consultation, the surrogacy contract is enforceable90 and the intent of the parties
is dispositive.
In 1993, in the landmark case of Johnson v. Calvert,91 the Supreme Court
of California applied the UPA standard to a surrogacy arrangement in the
state.92 In Johnson, a surrogate carrier bore a child with no genetic relationship
to her but wanted to keep the child, while the intended biological parents argued

85. See Carmina D’Aversa, The Right of Abortion in Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements, 7 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1987).
86. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (indicating the couples signed a
surrogacy agreement and that the “case [could not be] decided without enquiring into the parties’
intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement”).
87. Id.
88. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1761.
89. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
90. For a comprehensive look at how North Carolina can update its family laws, including
surrogacy agreements, in accordance with UPA, see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 802(a)(1), (a)(4),
(b)(1), (b)(3), 804 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). See also Saxon, supra note 28, at 18–19.
91. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
92. Id. at 782.
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the child was theirs.93 The court used the UPA’s parent-child relationship
standard to apply an intent-based test94 and held that the child’s intended
parents were the legal parents.95 The intended parents’ desire to have a child
caused the pregnancy of the surrogate carrier.96
California took its enforcement of intent-based parentage one step further
in 2012 with section 7962, a statute which specifically validates and enforces
surrogacy agreements between intended parents and surrogate carriers,
provided that certain conditions are met.97 The “presumptively valid” surrogacy
contract98 solidified California’s long-held position that only the intent of the
parties to the contract should determine the legal parents of the child.99 Once
the intended parents have executed a surrogacy contract that conforms to the
requirements of section 7962, the surrogate carrier no longer has any legal right
to the child she carried, and the intended parents are the legal parents of the
child.100
For many surrogacy arrangements, this process works smoothly because
both parties receive what they contracted for: the surrogate carrier has the baby
for the intended parents and may receive compensation, and the intended
parents receive the baby they intend to parent. However, problems arise when
the surrogate carrier refuses to give up the child she carried. One of the most
recent examples of this situation came in the California case of Cook v.
Harding.101 In Cook, a valid surrogacy contract existed between the surrogate
carrier and plaintiff, Cook, and the intended, biological, single father, C.M.102
The surrogate carried triplets for C.M., who was then a fifty-year-old, deaf man
living with his parents on the opposite side of the country.103 Despite the valid
surrogacy contract, Cook began having second thoughts about the arrangement
a few months into her pregnancy when C.M. asked her to abort at least one of

93. Id. at 778.
94. Id. at 782.
95. Id. at 778.
96. Id. at 782 (“[S]he who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring
about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California
law.”).
97. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(4), (b) (Westlaw through ch. 161 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (requiring,
for example, that both parties be represented by independent counsel and that the surrogacy contract
contain information on how the intended parents will pay for the surrogate mother’s medical expenses).
98. Id. § 7962(i).
99. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1760–61.
100. § 7962(f)(2) (“Subject to proof of compliance with this section, the judgment or order shall
establish the parent-child relationship of the intended parent or intended parents identified in the
surrogacy agreement and shall establish that the surrogate, her spouse, or partner is not a parent of,
and has no parental rights or duties with respect to, the child or children.”).
101. 190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018).
102. Id. at 928.
103. Id. C.M. lived in Georgia with his two aging parents. Id.
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the fetuses due to financial concerns regarding medical care.104 Cook refused
and continued the pregnancy as planned.105 A few weeks before the children
were born, C.M. seemingly had a change of heart and exercised his rights under
section 7962 to terminate Cook’s parental rights and became sole legal parent
of the three children.106 Concerned about the well-being of the children, Cook
challenged section 7962 on constitutional due process and equal protection
grounds.107 She posited that the family court’s decision to uphold the surrogacy
contract violated the children’s due process rights to have a relationship with
their mother and violated her due process rights to a hearing before the
termination of her parental rights.108 However, the district court refused to rule
on the merits, citing federalism concerns and the right of the state of California
to deal with family law matters.109 As such, the family court’s decision to
terminate Cook’s parental rights relating to the triplets stands,110 and section
7962 currently remains good law in the state of California.111
The Cook case illustrates the difficulties with using a solely intent-based
test to determine the enforceability of surrogacy contracts.112 While intent tests
and section 7962 certainly ease the burden on family courts, permitting the
court to look no further than the four corners of the presumptively valid
contract, can lead to situations where the best interests of the children are
ignored.113 In Cook, while the intended father became hesitant about the contract
and pushed to terminate the pregnancy, the surrogate carrier was a willing
parent, offering to adopt one of the fetuses.114 Despite the surrogate carrier’s
willingness to parent the children, parentage was awarded to the intended
parent who, at one time, had tried to eliminate the fetus.115 This rigid conformity
to the terms of the surrogacy contract, regardless of what might best benefit the
children, has led some commentators to reject section 7962 in favor of
multifactor tests that include the intent of the parents, best interests of the
children, and other genetic and gestational factors.116

104. Id. at 928–29.
105. Id. at 929.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 929–31.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 936.
110. Id. at 930, 938.
111. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (Westlaw through ch. 161 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
112. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1767–68.
113. Id.
114. Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 929.
115. Id.
116. For more on this approach and an innovative point-based test, see Demopoulos, supra note
34, at 1776–80.
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New Jersey’s Best Interests Test

On the opposite end of the spectrum from California’s rigid intent-based
test lies the best interests test, first promulgated by the aforementioned and
well-known case In re Baby M.117 In that case, as with many surrogacy disputes,
the surrogate carrier refused to give up the child and a legal battle ensued.118
The New Jersey Supreme Court eventually awarded custody of the child,119 who
was genetically a product of the surrogate carrier and intended father, to the
intended father but not on the basis of the surrogacy contract. 120 Rather, the
court found that surrogacy contracts, especially those in which the surrogate
carrier is compensated for carrying the child, violate the state’s public policy
and existing statutes.121 The court took special issue with the contractual
termination of the surrogate carrier’s parental rights because a New Jersey
statute already provided the legal pathway to terminate parental rights.122
Instead of upholding the surrogacy contract and deciding the issue of
parentage of Baby M, the court decided only the issue of custody on the basis
of a best interests test, the standard required for custody disputes under New
Jersey law.123 Under its best interests analysis, the court considered such factors
as: the stability and financial situation of the home; the employment history of
the parties; the potential presence of alcohol abuse by either party; and the
“prospects for wholesome, independent psychological growth and
development” of the baby.124 Had the case been decided under the intent-based
framework of California, the intended father and his wife would certainly have
been granted both custody and full legal parentage of the child because the
parties had executed a valid surrogacy contract.125 While ultimately reaching the
117. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
118. Id. at 1237.
119. Importantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not decide the issue of parentage, only
custody. Id. at 1234.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1234, 1240.
122. New Jersey requires a “written surrender to an approved agency or to [Division of Youth and
Family Services]” or “a very strong showing of abandonment or neglect.” Id. at 1243. “[I]t is clear that
a contractual agreement to abandon one’s parental rights, or not to contest a termination action, will
not be enforced in our courts.” Id. The court continually reiterated this point throughout the opinion.
Id. at 1245 (“Contractual surrender of parental rights is not provided for in our statutes as now
written.”).
123. Id. at 1256 (“With the surrogacy contract disposed of, the legal framework becomes a dispute
between two couples over the custody of a child produced by the artificial insemination of one couple’s
wife by the other’s husband. Under the Parentage Act the claims of the natural father and the natural
mother are entitled to equal weight, i.e., one is not preferred over the other solely because he or she is
the father or the mother. The applicable rule given these circumstances is clear: the child’s best interests
determine custody.” (citations omitted)).
124. Id. at 1258–59.
125. See CAL FAM. CODE § 7962(i) (Westlaw through ch. 161 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“An assisted
reproduction agreement for gestational carriers executed in accordance with this section is
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same custody (although not parentage) decision as California, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in In re Baby M left the door open to a surrogate carrier gaining
full custody of a child intended for other parents, should it be in the best
interests of the child.126 States like Massachusetts have relied on existing family
law doctrine to determine that surrogacy contracts—especially for
compensation—are invalid, and courts must determine the best interests of the
child.127
One of the main issues with the divisive In re Baby M decision lies in the
court’s reluctance to determine the legal parentage of the child, deciding the
case only on custody grounds.128 The court relied on existing family law statutes
in New Jersey to resolve a custody dispute between two genetic parents.129
However, the court avoided the far more difficult question of who remained the
legal parent of Baby M.130 Courts have long settled mere custody disputes, as
opposed to disputes over parentage, by examining the best interests of the
child.131 However,
[t]he determination becomes more difficult . . . when a woman agrees
before conception to bear a child for an infertile or same-sex couple and
then changes her mind once the baby is born. Surrogacy cases raise
additional concerns because it is not just custody, but parentage that is
at issue.132
C.

A Hybrid Test: Contract Law and Best Interests

In an apparent attempt to reconcile the intent-based and the best interests
tests, some states have combined elements of both. For example, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin recently applied basic contract law to surrogacy agreements
presumptively valid and shall not be rescinded or revoked without a court order.”); see also Cook v.
Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018).
126. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1257 (“The issue here is which life would be better for Baby M,
one with primary custody in the Whiteheads [the surrogate mother and her husband] or one with
primary custody in the Sterns [the intended, biological father and his wife].” (emphasis omitted)). For
more on best interests tests, see Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1756–57.
127. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998) (“No private agreement concerning
adoption or custody can be conclusive in any event because a judge, passing on custody of a child, must
decide what is in the best interests of the child.”).
128. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1256–57.
129. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (Westlaw through L.2019, c. 266 and J.R. No. 22); see also In
re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1256.
130. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1256–57.
131. Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary
Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
477, 485 (2011).
132. Id.; see Rachel M. Kane, Cause of Action for Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents
of Children Borne by Surrogate or Gestational Carrier, in 48 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 687, § 20, Westlaw
(database updated July 2019) (listing the states that employ a best interests test); see also Demopoulos,
supra note 34, at 1756–57.
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and upheld their validity, provided that the agreement did not violate the best
interests of the child.133 Other states, such as Tennessee, uphold surrogacy
agreements so long as they do not terminate the parental rights of the surrogate
carrier—if she is also the genetic mother—before the child’s birth.134 However,
these attempts to determine parentage of a child born to a surrogate mother
tend to be ad hoc and often draw heavily from the state’s existing family law
regime.135
IV. NORTH CAROLINA’S EXISTING FAMILY LAW STATUTES
Despite some criticism that states dealing with surrogacy do so on an ad
hoc basis by drawing from existing family law statutes,136 it makes sense to
examine a state’s family laws—including those involving custody and
adoption—to craft a surrogacy statute rather than start from scratch.137 This part
first briefly touches on North Carolina’s adoption statutes.138 It then explores
North Carolina’s custody laws and points out similarities between North
Carolina’s existing laws and the intent-based and best interests tests explained
above.
A.

North Carolina Adoption Statutes

The current North Carolina law on adoption, codified at article 3 of
chapter 48 of the North Carolina General Statutes, permits a mother to revoke
her consent to adoption within seven days of giving that consent.139 Professor
Katherine Bartlett, writing thirty years ago, argued that this law exists to protect
the biological mother from exploitative circumstances surrounding the
relinquishment of her child and that these same pressures exist in a surrogacy
agreement.140 However, this argument is flawed, especially in the case of
gestational surrogacy, in two ways. First, it presupposes that the woman
carrying the child is the child’s legal mother in all cases. There is support for the
proposition that, at least in certain circumstances, the carrier of the child is the

133. In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 648 (Wis. 2013).
134. See In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 833, 834 (Tenn. 2014).
135. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 644 (“Many courts have encountered issues surrounding
surrogacy, and the cases often involve ad hoc procedures attempting to effectuate the parties’ intent by
analyzing surrogacy issues under the state’s statutes for [termination of parental rights], adoption,
custody and placement, and the like.”).
136. See id.
137. Other scholars have taken this approach to addressing surrogacy statutes, as well. See Bartlett,
supra note 30, at 1–2.
138. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 644–45; see also Bartlett, supra note 30, at 3–4 (describing the
proposition that adoption statutes lend themselves more easily to informing surrogacy statutes).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-3-601(1), -608(a), (2017).
140. Bartlett, supra note 30, at 4–5 (“[I]t is questionable whether any woman can make a wellconsidered decision about surrendering her child for adoption before the child is born.”).
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child’s legal mother, regardless of the lack of genetic relationship.141 However,
this broad presumption leaves little room for the genetic mother—whose desire
for motherhood brought the child into the world and whose biological child the
surrogate carries—to make any decisions regarding the child.
Second, this argument also presumes that surrogate carriers are under the
same exploitative pressures as a woman who has naturally conceived a child of
her own and has determined she cannot care for it. Instead, unlike a mother
who determines she cannot care for a child she naturally conceived, a gestational
carrier becomes pregnant with the full knowledge that she carries the child for
someone else.142 This difference between adoption and surrogacy alone is
enough to differentiate between the public policy reasons for revocation of
consent in adoption situations and the contractual nature of a surrogacy
agreement.143
Of course, there are similarities between planned adoptions of infants and
surrogacy; namely, in both situations, a woman carries a child she will not raise
as her own. These issues are complex, and courts should remain sensitive to any
potential exploitation of either biological mothers giving their children up for
adoption or surrogate carriers. However, this section simply argues that
adoption and surrogacy are not interchangeable concepts, and based on the two
above-mentioned faulty presumptions, it would be unwise to rely on North
Carolina’s adoption statute in crafting a surrogacy statute.

141. See In re Adoption of A.F.C., 491 S.W.3d 316, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the
“gestational carrier should be listed as the mother”); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., PA-2014-009, EFFECT OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) ON
IMMIGRATION AND ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ACT
(INA)
(2014),
https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Updates/20141028-ART.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Q2W-FRBT] (stating that “[a] gestational mother has a petitionable relationship
without a genetic relationship to the child, as long as she is also the child’s legal parent at the time of
birth” in the context of immigration).
142. This is not to suggest that a gestational carrier cannot develop maternal feelings for the child
she is carrying. Most of the controversy surrounding surrogacy and surrogacy lawsuits centers on this
very premise. As Bartlett points out, “That mothers will develop feelings of connection and
commitment to their children during the course of pregnancy, notwithstanding agreements they may
make to the contrary, demonstrates the strength of the parent-child relationship.” Bartlett, supra note
30, at 5. However, this Comment argues that this “mother-child” pre-birth relationship, so present in
adoption situations, is weakened in the gestational surrogacy context.
143. Other courts have come to this same conclusion. Indeed, the Johnson court, in examining the
defendant’s argument that, based on California’s adoption statutes, the surrogacy contract should be
voided, held “[g]estational surrogacy differs in crucial respects from adoption and so is not subject to
the adoption statutes. . . . We are, accordingly, unpersuaded that the contract used in this case violates
the public policies embodied in [the relevant California penal code] and the adoption statutes.” Johnson
v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993); see Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d
1133, 1138 (Mass. 2001) (“As is evident from its provisions, the adoption statute was not intended to
resolve parentage issues arising from gestational surrogacy agreements.”).
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North Carolina Child Custody Statutes

A more promising approach would be for the North Carolina General
Assembly to adapt North Carolina’s child custody laws to the surrogacy
arrangement. Like many states, North Carolina employs a best interests test
when settling custody disputes.144 In determining the best interests of a child in
custody situations, courts consider the following: the special needs of a child;
the home, neighborhood, and school of the child; the religious instruction one
parent intends to provide; the type of discipline; substance abuse; and domestic
violence.145 However, North Carolina does not automatically resort to a best
interests analysis in every custody dispute; rather, North Carolina courts only
apply this standard after the court first determines that a natural parent has
somehow not acted in the best interests of the child.146
North Carolina courts have long held, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, parents have a right to oversee the “care, custody,
and control of their children.”147 However, that constitutional protection is
weakened when parents “act[] in a manner inconsistent with [this]
constitutionally-protected status.”148 In those circumstances, courts will
intervene to apply a “best interest[s] of the child test.”149 Importantly, the
parent does not have to commit some “bad act[]” that might “endanger the
children” in order to give up his or her constitutionally protected status.150
Rather, the act could be something as simple as choosing to start a family with
another person and “ced[ing] to [that person] a sufficiently significant amount
of parental responsibility and decision-making authority to create a permanent
parent-like relationship with his or her child.”151 In that case, the person to
whom the parent ceded authority would have a strong claim to custody.152
Further, the parent seeking custody must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the natural parent in fact acted in a manner inconsistent with
being a parent.153 Importantly, when making this determination, North Carolina

144. See Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534 (1997); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.2(a) (2017).
145. See 1 LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA F AMILY LAW PRACTICE § 13:11 (database
updated Dec. 2017) (articulating factors in determining the best interest of a child).
146. Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534; see also Estroff v. Chatterjee, 190 N.C. App. 61, 63–
64, 660 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2008).
147. Heatzig v. MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 451, 454, 664 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2008).
148. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 350 (citing Price, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 455, 664 S.E.2d at 351.
151. Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 70, 660 S.E.2d at 78.
152. See id.
153. David N. v. Jason N., 359 N.C. 303, 307, 608 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2005).
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courts look to the intent behind the parent’s actions.154 Thus, the natural parent
has to intend to give “parent-like status” to another person before they have
ceded some of their constitutional protections as parent.155 In sum, North
Carolina uses a two-part test to determine custody of children: the court looks
first to see whether the natural parent intended to cede some of his or her
constitutionally protected authority over his or her children; and, if so, the court
will employ a best interests test to settle which parent should retain custody of
the child.156
North Carolina courts have used this test in a number of child custody
cases. For example, in the Mason v. Dwinnell,157 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that a natural mother had so intentionally involved her domestic
partner in her children’s lives, including using the partner’s name as “parent”
on school forms and declaring her a parent at the children’s baptisms, that she
acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status as parent.158 As
such, the court could apply a best interests test to determine who, between the
natural mother and her domestic partner, should have custody of the children.159
Notably, the court did not decide the issue of parentage in this case, indicating
that the domestic partner did not achieve the status of a legal parent.160 Rather,
the domestic partner simply had a right to custody of the child, under the best
interests test.161
In another case with very similar facts, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals reached a different conclusion. Estroff v. Chatterjee162 also involved two
domestic partners, with Ms. Chatterjee, the younger of the two women,
deciding that she wished to bear children.163 Despite the women living as
partners in the same home, Ms. Chatterjee intended to raise the children as her
own and rejected the idea that Estroff was the “other mom.”164 The court held
that Ms. Chatterjee decided to have children on her own and merely got
154. Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 70, 660 S.E.2d at 78–79 (“By looking at both the legal parent’s
conduct and his or her intentions, we ensure that the situation is not one in which the third party has
assumed a parent-like status on his or her own without that being the goal of the legal parent.”).
155. Id.
156. See Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534 (1997); see also Heatzig v.
MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 451, 454, 664 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2008); Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 68, 660 S.E.2d
at 77.
157. 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).
158. Id. at 223, 660 S.E.2d at 67.
159. Id. at 223, 227–28, 660 S.E.2d at 67, 70.
160. Id. at 227–28, 660 S.E.2d at 70 (“[The natural mother’s] choice [to cede some of her parental
authority] does not mean that [the domestic partner] is entitled to the rights of a legal parent, but only
that a trial court may apply the ‘best interest of the child’ standard in considering [the domestic
partner’s] request for custody, including visitation.”).
161. Id.
162. 190 N.C. App. 61, 660 S.E.2d 73 (2008).
163. Id. at 65, 660 S.E.2d at 75.
164. Id., 660 S.E.2d at 76.
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permission from her partner to raise the children in the home in which they
lived; Ms. Chatterjee alone picked the sperm donor; she did not permit hospital
staff to call Ms. Estroff the “other mom”; and she emphasized that she alone
was the children’s mother.165 These findings of fact led the court to determine
that Ms. Chatterjee did not intend to relinquish her constitutional protection
as parent of the twins, and therefore, a best interests test could not be applied
for custody purposes.166
The difference in outcomes between Mason and Chatterjee illustrates just
how seriously North Carolina courts examine parental intent to determine
whether a parent has ceded his or her constitutional protections. In Mason, the
court found intent in the natural mother’s actions and therefore applied a best
interests test, eventually awarding custody to both the natural mother and
domestic partner in the best interests of the child.167 By contrast, the same court
in Chatterjee could not find intent to cede in the actions of the natural mother
and therefore did not proceed to a best interests test determination.168
To summarize, in dealing with child custody cases, North Carolina courts
primarily consider whether or not a natural parent has intended to give up some
of his or her constitutional protection as parent. Once a court has determined
that a parent has intended to act in a way that is inconsistent with his or her
constitutional privileges, the court will look to the best interests of the child to
decide the custody arrangement.
V. APPLYING NORTH CAROLINA’S CUSTODY LAWS TO SURROGACY
North Carolina custody laws already contain the basic framework for a
workable, practical parentage test for surrogacy situations. It is readily apparent,
merely from the language of the custody cases above, that both intent and best
interests play a large role in settling custody disputes in North Carolina. Intent
of the parties and best interests of the child are also the main methods other
states have used to give effect to surrogacy arrangements to determine
parentage of a surrogate child. This section explores the possibility that North
Carolina lawmakers can map onto the pre-existing custody laws to determine a
child’s legal parentage.
A.

A Proposal for North Carolina Surrogacy Law

I propose a two-prong test for legal parentage in North Carolina surrogacy
cases. First, did the surrogate carrier agree to carry a child for the intended
165. Id. at 74, 660 S.E.2d at 81 (“Chatterjee did not choose to create a family unit with two parents,
did not intend that Estroff would be a ‘de facto parent,’ and did not allow Estroff to function fully as a
parent.” (citation omitted)).
166. Id. at 75, 660 S.E.2d at 82.
167. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 230, 232, 660 S.E.2d 58, 71, 72 (2008).
168. Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 75, 660 S.E.2d at 82.
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parents, and did the intended parents agree to receive the child as their own, as
evidenced by a valid surrogacy agreement? Second, would the surrogacy
agreement be in the best interests of the child?
Under the first prong, if a valid surrogacy agreement exists, there should
be a strong presumption in favor of awarding parentage to the intended parents
because the surrogate carrier has shown intent to cede to the intended parents
any constitutional parenting rights she may have had, as in the North Carolina
custody decisions. For the second prong, the burden should lie with the
surrogate carrier to show that the arrangement would not be in the best interests
of the child. This section will explain each prong in more detail.
Under current custody laws, North Carolina first looks to the intent of the
natural parent: Did that parent intend to give up some of his or her
constitutionally protected parental privileges?169 The same test should be
applied to determine parentage, as well: Did the surrogate carrier intend to give
up some of her rights as a parent?170 If there is a valid surrogacy agreement, then
North Carolina law should presume that the surrogate carrier did indeed intend
to give up her rights to the child, just as the parent who ceded some of his
authority as parent to a domestic partner in Mason gave up some of his custodial
rights.171
To determine the validity of the surrogacy agreement between the parties,
and thus satisfy that the surrogate mother intended to relinquish any rights she
held as parent, this Comment proposes using the UPA’s list of criteria.172 For
example, section 802 of the UPA states:
(a) To execute an agreement to act as a gestational or genetic surrogate,
a woman must: (1) have attained 21 years of age; (2) previously have
given birth to at least one child; (3) complete a medical evaluation related
to the surrogacy arrangement by a licensed medical doctor; (4) complete
a mental-health consultation by a licensed mental-health professional;
and (5) have independent legal representation of her choice throughout
169. See supra text accompanying notes 121–30.
170. I adopt Kristen Bradley’s assumption that the surrogate mother does have some rights as the
person who birthed the child for the purposes of this test. However, these rights are quickly settled as
against the intended parent’s rights to the child using this test. For more on these constitutional
implications of surrogacy, see Kristen Bradley, Assisted Reproductive Technology After Roe v. Wade: Does
Surrogacy Create Insurmountable Constitutional Conflicts?, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1871, 1901 (“It would be
difficult to argue that a surrogate is suddenly devoid of all rights to her bodily integrity upon becoming
a surrogate.”). See also Spivack, supra note 6, at 109 (expressing one constitutional argument that
“because of her privacy right, the surrogate cannot waive the right to the child she carries, and that
these rights trump the rights of the intended parents if the surrogate should change her mind at the
birth of the child”). But see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the
constitutional rights of “substantive due process, privacy, and procreative freedom” do not apply to
gestational surrogate mothers).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 157–61.
172. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 802–804 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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the surrogacy arrangement regarding the terms of the surrogacy
agreement and the potential legal consequences of the agreement.
(b) To execute a surrogacy agreement, each intended parent, whether or
not genetically related to the child, must: (1) have attained 21 years of
age; (2) complete a medical evaluation related to the surrogacy
arrangement by a licensed medical doctor; (3) complete a mental-health
consultation by a licensed mental health professional; and (4) have
independent legal representation of the intended parent’s choice
throughout the surrogacy arrangement regarding the terms of the
surrogacy agreement and the potential legal consequences of the
agreement.173
Once North Carolina adopts these requirements, a court could easily
discern whether a disputed surrogacy agreement is valid or not. If valid, the
court would presumptively hold that the surrogate carrier intended to relinquish
any constitutional rights she may have had with regard to the surrogate child.
This intent prong represents the bulk of the test. Once a court has found
a valid surrogacy arrangement in place, intent on the part of the surrogate
carrier is presumed, and the court should lean strongly toward awarding
parentage to the intended parents.174 As other proponents of an intent-based
test have noted, relying on the contract between the parties gives intended
parents a “bright-line test,” removing some of the uncertainty related to
parentage of a surrogate child.175 In addition, North Carolina custody law is
already well-settled in this area, so courts would simply have to apply the same
test they always do in other areas of family law—what was the intent of the
parent, or, in surrogacy cases, the surrogate carrier?
However, using an intent-based test alone, even if based in existing North
Carolina custody law, can lead to troubling results. Many argue that a surrogate
carrier cannot contractually give away her constitutionally protected right to
privacy, which is inherent in the surrogacy arrangement.176 Others have argued

173. Id. § 802.
174. This part of the test very much mirrors California’s section 7962(i), which reads:
An assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers executed in accordance with this
section is presumptively valid and shall not be rescinded or revoked without a court order. For
purposes of this part, any failure to comply with the requirements of this section shall rebut
the presumption of the validity of the assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(i) (Westlaw through ch. 161 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
175. See Teresa Abell, Gestational Surrogacy: Intent-Based Parenthood in Johnson v. Calvert, 45
MERCER L. REV. 1429, 1436 (1994) (“Infertile couples will continue to search for ways to procreate,
and they should be able to rely on contracting parties to their endeavors to keep their promises.”); see
also Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1761 (“Supporters of intent-based tests point to positives such as
providing a bright-line, the avoidance of uncertainty, and conformance with contractual principles.”).
176. See Spivack, supra note 6, at 109.
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that surrogacy contracts violate the constitutional rights of the surrogate
children themselves, as the contracts tend to commodify children, and some
states treat surrogate children differently than adopted children.177 Finally, as in
the case of Cook v. Harding, an intent-based test may not lead to a scenario in
the best interests of the child.178 Responding to these concerns, North Carolina
should also introduce a second prong to the parentage test: a best interests
standard.
As with custody law, once a court examining a surrogacy contract finds
intent, it should next turn to the best interests of the child. In this
determination, the court should again award a strong presumption in favor of
the intended parents. The California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert
iterated the main reason for doing so: “but for” the desire of the intended
parents, the surrogate child would never have been born.179 Although California
observes an intent-based test, the Johnson court reasoned that awarding
parentage to the people who intended for the child to be born was also in the
child’s best interests.180 This reasoning is both persuasive and logical because
many of the factors that North Carolina courts examine when determining the
best interests of the child, including the stability of the home and the financial
resources of the parents, would seem to favor the intended parents whose very
intent and desire brought the surrogate child into the world.181 North Carolina
should likewise presume that awarding parentage to the intended parents would
also be in the child’s best interests.
Yet, this presumption should be rebuttable. There are some situations in
which parentage might better remain with the surrogate carrier instead of the
intended parents, as the case of Cook v. Harding arguably demonstrates.182 For
example, circumstances might so change between the formation of the surrogacy
contract and the time of the child’s birth that the best interests of the surrogate
child change as well. In those cases, North Carolina would be wise to adopt a
law that allows for flexibility.
Consider, for example, how this test would apply to the facts of Cook. The
California court hearing the case decided in favor of the intended father, despite
valid misgivings on the part of the surrogate carrier, in order to uphold the
surrogacy contract. Should a court apply this Comment’s proposed test to the
177. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1765–66, 1770.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16.
179. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (“But for [the intended parents’] actedon intention, the child would not exist.”).
180. Spivack, supra note 6, at 103; see also Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1762 (“Commentators
have also argued that intended parents who enter surrogacy arrangements have a deep desire to parent,
which usually translates to them successfully fulfilling their parental duties.”).
181. See supra text accompanying note 145.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 101–16 (explaining the facts of Cook and why the surrogate
carrier was arguably the better parent as between her and the intended father of the children).
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same set of facts, it is likely the court would award the surrogate carrier, not the
intended father, parentage of the child. First, the court would find that the
surrogate carrier intended to cede some of her constitutional authority to the
intended father due to the validly executed surrogacy contract. Having found
this, the court would move to the best interests prong of the test, with a strong
presumption in favor of the intended father because he is the parent whose
intent to raise a child brought the child into the world. However, examining the
specific facts of this case—namely, that the intended father had at one time
asked for an abortion of at least one of the fetuses, was in his fifties and deaf,
and resided with his elderly parents183—the court would likely conclude the best
interests of the children would be served with the surrogate carrier as their legal
parent.184
There are, of course, arguments against adopting a multipart test such as
the one listed above. For example, those who favor the UPA may criticize this
proposal185 because the UPA does not allow for a best interests analysis in the
case of a valid surrogacy arrangement186 and instead severs all parentage rights
of the surrogate carrier upon birth of the child.187 These opponents of a best
interests analysis would argue that giving up the child upon birth is exactly what
the surrogate carrier contracted to do, and she should be held to that contract.
Indeed, for some it is a form of paternalism for the state to allow a woman to
back out of a contract once she has entered it.188 Thirty years ago, much of
Bartlett’s argument to permit a woman to revoke her agreement to serve as
surrogate was based on the notion that “it is questionable whether any woman
can make a well-considered decision about surrendering her child for adoption
before the child is born.”189 Such a paternalistic theory would not and should
183. Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928–29 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.
2018).
184. Surrogacy author Matthew Demopoulos came to the same conclusion regarding Cook v.
Harding, using a different test. Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1779–80. However, his test determined
only custody, not parentage. Id.
185. Those proponents of the UPA may include several North Carolina family law experts. See
generally Boughton, supra note 1 (referencing the commentary of Jennifer Tharrington and Maxine
Eichner on such policies).
186. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 601(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“A proceeding to
adjudicate the parentage of a child born under a surrogacy agreement is governed by [Article] 8.”); see
also id. art. 8.
187. Id. § 809(b) (stating that “neither a gestational surrogate, nor the surrogate’s spouse or former
spouse, if any, is a parent of the child” so long as the surrogacy agreement follows the requirements of
the UPA according to section 812(a)).
188. Indeed, this argument has been used in other areas of family law, most notably in the context
of premarital agreements. Paternalism in contracting was used to strike down some state laws that
permitted women to renege on premarital agreements. See Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.
1990) (“Paternalistic presumptions and protections that arose to shelter women from the inferiorities
and incapacities which they were perceived as having in earlier times have, appropriately, been
discarded.”).
189. Bartlett, supra note 30, at 5.
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not hold much weight today, as it is premised on sexist notions of the frailty of
female decisionmaking.
By contrast, others might critique this test as placing too much emphasis on
the surrogacy contract and not enough on the surrogate carrier’s unique legal
position. Indeed, under my proposal, intended parents have a strong
presumption of legal parenthood, absent some serious showing that the best
interests of the child would be served by remaining with the surrogate carrier.
However, I believe this proposal strikes the appropriate balance between the
intent-based and best interests tests. To be sure, the proposal slants strongly in
favor of the intended parents, so long as the surrogacy contract is valid. Yet,
unlike the pure intent-based test, it leaves the door open for a surrogate carrier
to express her genuine concerns about the well-being of the child she carried, in
line with the concerns of Bartlett and other scholars.
CONCLUSION
Surrogacy across the United States is becoming a more popular alternative
for couples who are unable to carry their own children. As artificial reproductive
techniques advance, so too must the law. North Carolina remains one of the
many states that has not provided any guidance, either by statute or case law,
for its citizens considering a surrogacy arrangement. North Carolina can and
should pass a surrogacy law because the state would receive it well, and it would
give peace of mind to intended parents looking to ensure their surrogate
children are legally theirs. North Carolina family law is already a landscape
conducive to the types of tests that other states have used in order to determine
parentage of a surrogate child: specifically the intent-based and best interests
tests. North Carolina’s two-prong custody test, including a consideration of
both intent and best interests, provides the basis of a statute by which to
determine parentage in surrogacy cases. By adopting a surrogacy statute, the
state can provide much-needed reassurance to people considering surrogacy
without disrupting the current family law framework. In doing so, North
Carolina will update its laws to better reflect its citizens’ needs and bring itself
in line with modern reproductive practices.
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